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Introduction
Individual myopic adaptation in strategic games has been studied since the time of A. Cournot. An important step was made recently by Monderer and Shapley (1996a) , who established a link between unilateral improvement dynamics and "potential functions" in finite games and produced an impressive list of games having the finite improvement path (FIP) property, i.e., where every unilateral improvement path eventually leads to a Nash equilibrium. Milchtaich (1996) introduced a weaker finite best response improvement path (FBRP) property and showed that it is present in some games without FIP. Kukushkin (1999) suggested the use of the language of binary relations: both FIP and FBRP are easily restated as the acyclicity of the appropriate individual improvement relations. A potential is also understood as a strict order rather than a numeric function.
This paper applies the Monderer-Shapley-Milchtaich approach to a class of strategic games with natural algebraic properties. First, we assume that all strategies are scalar and each player is only affected by the sum of the partners' choices. This class of games was recognized and axiomatically characterized by Selten (1970, Chapters 8 and 9), and includes economic models such as the private provision of a public good (bad) and the Cournot oligopoly.
Second, we only consider finite games. Since no market in the world trades in infinitesimal (or indefinitely large, for that matter) quantities of any goods, this feature cannot be called unrealistic. The usual argument is that a continuous model is a convenient approximation to a discrete one when admissible points are dense enough on the real line. This paper shows that sometimes a discrete model may be more convenient. A similar treatment of continuous games is actually possible (Kukushkin, 2000a) , but much more difficult technically.
Finally, a monotonicity condition is imposed in each theorem. Two conditions are quite general in their nature and were recognized as such by Bulow et al. (1985) , who called them strategic complements and strategic substitutes, respectively. Both conditions are met in economic models quite often, see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Section 12. 3) and references there. The third only makes sense in games with additive aggregation; it was first formulated in the Cournot oligopoly model (P − C < 0) and is often considered indispensable for the stability of equilibria.
It seems appropriate, therefore, to stress that here the condition is only imposed in Theorem 3, where it is coupled with symmetry as in the seminal papers by McManus (1962, 1964) .
Individual adaptation has been studied in games with strategic complementarities. Topkis (1979, Algorithm I) proved the convergence of best response improvement paths starting from the very bottom (or the very top) of the strategy profiles space. Vives (1990) extended the result to paths starting "very high" or "very low". Milgrom and Roberts (1990) considered rather general adaptive learning processes, but did not study their convergence. Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) proved that if the strategy sets are finite chains, then every strategy profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a unilateral improvement path; they called the property "weak FIP." Here we are interested in convergence to an equilibrium of all best response improvement paths, and we have to additionally assume additivity.
As to improvement dynamics in games with strategic substitutes, a very recent paper by Dubey et al. (2002) , which treats strategic complements and substitutes uniformly, seems the only relevant reference. A comparison with this paper can be found in Section 7.9.
From a purely technical viewpoint, there are two principal ways to prove acyclicity.
Sometimes, one can immediately derive a contradiction from the assumed existence of an improvement cycle, as in Theorem 1 below; alternatively, an explicit definition of a potential, i.e., of a strict order on the set of strategy profiles such that every best response improvement pushes the current profile upwards, can be obtained, as in Theorem 2. In Theorem 3, an intermediate course is taken: an explicit "quasipotential" is defined, i.e., a preorder such that every best response improvement either pushes the profile upwards or leaves it on the same level, and, when every player has made an improvement, the profile inevitably goes upwards.
The next section contains basic definitions and notation. In Section 3, the three main theorems are formulated and one of them proved. More complicated proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are deferred to Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6, inserted on a suggestion of the associate editor, describes relationships between the notions of an order potential, used in this paper, and of a numeric potential, as introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996a) . A discussion of possible extensions and open problems in Section 7 concludes the paper.
A strategic game Γ is defined by a finite set of players N , and strategy sets X i and utility functions u i on X = i∈N X i for all i ∈ N . Throughout the paper only finite sets X i are considered. Γ is called a game with additive aggregation (an AA game) if each X i is a subset of the real line (X i ⊆ R) and, for each i ∈ N , there exists a
Remark. From the viewpoint of possible interpretations, perhaps, only regular games deserve attention; however, we do not assume regularity where it is not necessary.
For every AA game, player i ∈ N , and x ∈ X, we denote τ (x) = i∈N x i and
and S i = σ i (X), and define the best response correspondence:
We introduce a few binary relations on X (y, x ∈ X, i ∈ N ):
A Cournot path is a (finite or infinite) sequence {x For a finite game, the absence of Cournot cycles obviously means that every Cournot path, if continued whenever possible, ends at a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium is implied. For all admissible s i , x i , and δ > 0, we define
The increment helps to formulate various useful properties.
x i , the utility function is concave in own variable; however, this property is useless in discrete models studied in this paper. If the increment increases in s i , there is Topkis's increasing differences property, which implies that the best response correspondence R i is increasing in the sense of Veinott (Topkis, 1978) ; if every V i has the property, a Nash equilibrium exists by the Tarski (1955) fixed point theorem. If the increment decreases in s i for each i ∈ N , the existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from the main theorem of Kukushkin (1994) ; the proof of the latter was based on a construction invented by Novshek (1985) for continuous games.
Finally, in a regular AA game, the situation deserves attention when
increases in a diagonal direction, with x i decreasing, s i increasing, and their sum keeping constant. Kukushkin (2000b) established the existence of an equilibrium in quasisymmetric discrete games with this property of utilities, extending the results obtained by McManus (1962 McManus ( , 1964 for symmetric continuous Cournot models. It was also noted in that paper that the condition can be regarded as innocuous in the context of the voluntary provision of a public good: it is satisfied if no increase in the consumption of the private good could increase its relative value to the consumer.
The three main theorems of this paper establish the absence of Cournot cycles under some ordinal versions of the three above properties, each of which could be named "single crossing" (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) .
Theorems
An AA game satisfies the strategic complements condition if
for all i ∈ N and all admissible s i , x i , and δ, ∆ ≥ 0. 
, and
An AA game satisfies the strict strategic substitutes condition if
for all i ∈ N and all admissible s i , x i , and δ, ∆ > 0. For mysterious reasons, our third condition has no commonly accepted name although it is widely used in the literature (usually in a cardinal form). Kukushkin (2000b) suggested the term "dual strategic substitutes" because both (3) and (4) mean that sign(D i ) decreases along the coordinate axes in the coordinates total of all strategies, own strategy (which are as natural as s i , x i used in this paper), while (2) means that sign(D i ) increases along the first axis.
for all i ∈ N and all admissible s i , x i , and δ, ∆ > 0.
Remark. If the game is not regular, there may be no admissible ∆ at all in (4), making the condition vacuous.
An AA game is symmetric if all X i are identical and all utilities are "isomorphic":
Theorem 3. No symmetric regular AA game satisfying (4) admits a Cournot cycle.
4 Proof of Theorem 2
For each i ∈ N , x i ∈ X i , x ∈ X, and t ∈ T , we define:
An inequality ξ(y, t) ≥ ξ(x, t) is understood coordinate-wise; ξ(y, t) > ξ(x, t) means ξ(y, t) ≥ ξ(x, t) but not ξ(x, t) ≥ ξ(y, t) (Pareto dominance).
While following the proofs of the lemmas below, the reader might find it helpful to study on pictures how the graph of a decreasing mapping, R i (s i ), can intersect the "east-south-eastern" corners cut off by the inequalities in the definition of
from the plane with coordinates
there are too many possible configurations to be printed here. As to the meaning of the whole construction, I can only quote Kukushkin (1994) : "it remains somewhat a mystery why it works at all."
Lemma 4.2. These statements hold for every i ∈ N , t, t , t ∈ T , and
Proof. 
To prove the opposite inequality, we assume the contrary: Now we define these three binary relations on X:
The relation is obviously irreflexive.
Lemma 4.3. The relation is transitive.
Proof. With every pair y, x ∈ X such that y x, we associate τ *
can be associated with a relation, one of the inequalities is strict, hence
Proof. Let y i x; we have to consider two alternatives.
The impossibility of a Cournot cycle now immediately follows from Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4. Theorem 2 is proved.
Proof of Theorem 3
Considering symmetric games, we denote Y = X i for all i ∈ N and omit the subscript
Proof. Supposing the contrary, we denote
For every x ∈ X and m ∈ Y , we define:
Obviously, is transitive and is the asymmetric component of (y x ⇐⇒
[y x and not x y]).
The above constructions, unlike those from the previous section, admit an intuitive explanation. t ∈ Ψ(m) means that any strategy profile which sums up to t or more and contains no component greater than m cannot sum up to less than t after any best response improvement; ϕ(x) is thus "the greatest self-supporting level below x."
If µ does not increase (at a step of the process), whatever was self-supporting remains self-supporting, so ϕ cannot decrease (Lemma 5.2). When µ increases, we cannot be so sure about the previously self-supporting levels; fortunately, the new sum is then self-supporting itself (Lemma 5.3). 
, then, by Lemma 5.1, Proof. We obviously have µ(y)
Numeric and Order Potentials
In this section, we consider arbitrary finite games. The best response correspondence R i (·) (i ∈ N ) will be perceived as defined on X −i :
Besides the Cournot (best response) relation defined at the start of Section 2, a large number of other relations on X are worth being considered; e.g., y x ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ Remark. Monderer and Shapley (1996a) introduced the term FIP for a particular relation, viz. for the individual improvement relation in a strategic game; here we apply it to an abstract binary relation. The hope is that the context will always allow us to avoid confusion; besides, the "abstract" FIP is the property of a binary relation whereas "Monderer and Shapley's" FIP is the property of a game.
We say that a function P : X → R is a numeric potential for if
for all y, x ∈ X (utility theorists would say that P weakly represents ). An order potential for is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation on X such that y x ⇒ y x for all y, x ∈ X. A weak order potential for is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation on X such that
for all x ∈ X. A weak numeric potential for is a function P : X → R such that
for all x ∈ X. 
(x) ≥ p(y) + 1, hence P (y) > P (x).
Remark. Proposition 6.1 generalizes Lemma 2.5 of Monderer and Shapley (1996a Remark. There is no tradition of considering weak potentials in the literature. Both Milchtaich (1996) and Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) established the weak FIP property of some improvement relations in strategic games without producing explicit potentials.
Henceforth, we return to finite strategic games and denote the Cournot relation as defined in Section 2. The (weak) FIP property of this relation will be called (weak) FBRP property of the game, following Milchtaich (1996) . As suggested by the associate editor, a numeric potential for will be called a generalized best response potential of the game.
Proposition 6.3. For any finite game, a function P : X → R is a generalized best response potential if and only if for every i ∈ N and x
−i ∈ X −i , R i (x −i ) is an upper contour for the function P (·, x −i ), i.e.,
there exists a threshold level w(x
Proof. If P satisfies (6) and y x, i.e.,
, implying (5). Let P satisfy (5) and
The equality
suffices, but it need not hold as the example from Monderer and Shapley (1996a, p. 129) shows (in a 2 × 2 game, the best response and a better response amount to the same thing). The condition is much more natural when the "fictitious play"
property (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b; Huang, 2002 ) is under consideration; there seems to be no result on the FP property of games admitting a potential in the sense of (6). The characterization of games admitting a potential satisfying (7) in terms of "best response cycles" (Voorneveld, 2000) resembles Propositions 6.1 and 6.3 only superficially: a "best response compatible path" may pass through a Nash equilibrium without noticing it.
A property intermediate between FBRP and weak FBRP deserves attention. A finite game has the restricted FBRP property if there exist nonempty
is acyclic (i.e., has the "abstract" FIP property). Clearly, FBRP ⇒ restricted FBRP ⇒ weak FBRP.
Remark. FBRP itself can be considered a restricted version of Monderer and Shapley's FIP; however, it hardly makes sense to formalize the idea here.
A restricted best response potential is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation on X such that
for all x ∈ X and i ∈ N . Dubey et al. (2002) defined a "pseudopotential" as a
for all i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i (their continuity condition is satisfied automatically in a finite game); their Theorem 3 states, in particular, that every finite game admitting a pseudopotential has a Nash equilibrium. Proposition 6.3 above immediately implies that every generalized best response potential is a pseudopotential. Obviously, is an order potential for ; Proposition 6.1 implies the existence of a numeric potential P for . Let us show that P satisfies (8). Suppose the contrary:
clearly, z −i = x −i , which contradicts the choice of x i .
If [6.4.2] holds, we define
Obviously, P is a numeric potential for If [6.4.3] holds, we denote an order potential for * , existing by Proposition 6.1.
It is easy to see that is a restricted best response potential.
Remark. Proof. The sufficiency holds for every finite game. Let a game with #N = 2 have the weak FBRP property. In the light of Proposition 6.4, it is sufficient to produce a pseudopotential. We use the construction from the proof of Proposition 6.2 with some modification utilizing the two person assumption.
Since a best response cannot be improved upon,
. . and all k > 0. Now we define
It is easy to see that P satisfies the equation
(since #N = 2, the minimum in (9) is essential for x ∈ X * only) with the boundary condition P (x) = 0 for Nash equilibria. Equation (9) ensures that P is a pseudopotential (even regardless of #N = 2):
all y i x; it follows immediately from (9) that P (z) > P (x). Therefore, x i does not
Remark. A weak numeric best response potential need not be a pseudopotential, even in a two person game.
To summarize, both numeric and order approaches to finite potential games, including best response potentials, coalition improvement potentials (see, e.g., Holzman and Law-Yone, 1997), etc., are theoretically equivalent; the choice, in each case, should be based on convenience. The definition of the numeric potential in the proof of Proposition 6.1 is easily converted into a dynamic programming algorithm; for two or three person games with not too many strategies, the algorithm only needs a pen and a piece of paper to work (see Section 7.10). The same is true for the weak numeric potential from Proposition 6.2. However, such algorithms could hardly be used to establish that every game from an infinite class admits a potential. The proofs of the theorems of this paper demonstrate various ways to do so; in none of them a potential emerges as a numeric function, even though Propositions 6.1 and 6.3 imply that every game satisfying the conditions of any of the theorems admits a numeric potential in the sense of (6).
For binary relations on infinite sets, only two implications, [6.
, remain of Proposition 6.1. One inevitably gets a feeling that the FIP property is "too good to be true." Assuming X a separable metric space, Kukushkin (2000a) considered improvement paths parameterized by ordinal (generally, transfinite) numbers; the absence of improvement cycles is then equivalent to the existence of an order potential (as defined in Kukushkin, 1999) and to the "countable improvement path"
property, i.e., to the impossibility of an uncountable improvement path, which, in turn, implies that every improvement path in a compact space eventually reaches an equilibrium. Analogues of Theorems 1-3 hold in that setting; even the constructions proving Theorems 2 and 3 remain essentially the same (only more technical details is needed). Certainly, one does not have to accept the theory, but there seems to be no alternative.
7 Concluding Remarks 7.1. Although the subtraction of utilities is used in (1), the properties (2-4) are purely ordinal, i.e., invariant under any strictly increasing transformation of the utility function. Accordingly, this paper bears no relation whatsoever to the literature on cardinal notions of a potential (including a considerable part of Monderer and Shapley, 1996a) .
7.2. Exact analogues of Theorems 1 and 2 are valid for games with separable (not necessarily additive) aggregation; the proofs are virtually the same as above because subtraction is never used in either. Section 7 of Dubey et al. (2002) suggests that even separability need not be necessary. Without any assumption on aggregation, both theorems are definitely wrong.
As to Theorem 3, subtraction is essential in Lemma 5.1; although the condition (4) can be reformulated without subtraction, it can prove meaningless. However, assuming that each player is only affected by a separable (and symmetric), but not necessarily additive, aggregate, and postulating the "cumulative monotonicity" (Lemma 5.1) of the best replies, one can then prove the impossibility of a Cournot cycle in the same way as in Section 5 (again, there is no subtraction there).
7.3. It remains unclear whether Theorem 2 holds under the nonstrict strategic substitutes condition, i.e., under (3) with the nonstrict inequality. As to Theorem 3, it is definitely wrong under the "nonstrict dual strategic substitutes" condition. The nonstrict version of (4) is easily checked. We depict the utilities matrices, again assuming that the axes go from left to right and from bottom to top, thus breaking with a venerated tradition to have rows numbered in the opposite order; however, we follow the tradition in treating the vertical axis as belonging to player 1 and the horizontal one as belonging to player 2:
(0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (1, 1)
(1, 2) (1, 1) (2, 2) (2, 1) (2, 1) (2, 2) (1, 1) (1, 2)
(1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (0, 0)
Now a Cournot cycle is easy to see (underlined above).
7.4.
It is easy to see that, if R i (·) is replaced (naturally, starting from Section 2) . This is even a game with strictly increasing differences, but it admits an improvement cycle (underlined above). Such examples have been known to researchers in the field for quite some time (e.g., Sela, 1992) , but seem to have never been published. The "northwestern" corner of the right matrix is a unique Nash equilibrium; the weak FBRP is obvious. Nevertheless, there is no restricted FBRP because the unique best responses of players 1 and 2 in the left matrix form a cycle.
The example clarifies the difference between the two properties. Under the restricted FBRP, we can impose independent restrictions on each player's actions ensuring that an equilibrium will be reached eventually. Under the weak FBRP, cooperation between the players may be needed: if player 1 always moves from the northwestern corner of the left matrix before player 3, the equilibrium will never be reached. (Explicit cooperation can be replaced with a stochastic choice of the player to move at each step, as in Milchtaich, 1996, or Friedman and 7.8. Quite a few authors considered processes where, at each step, all players make their best response improvements simultaneously: an endomorphism X → X (if the uniqueness of the best responses is assumed additionally) may seem a simpler mathematical object than the Cournot relation . However, the behaviour of the players in such processes is distinctly less rational than in those considered here: In this paper, there is one active player at each step, who increases his utility level;
other players may suffer, but, at least, they do not contribute to their suffering. In a process with simultaneous moves, the players may participate in diminishing their own utilities. It is not surprising, therefore, that our assumptions do not exclude the cycling of such processes. On the other hand, the claim of Rand (1978) to have shown the possibility of rather complicated simultaneous best response improvement dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with zero costs (where the nonstrict version of (4) holds) is unfounded: the reaction functions there violate the cumulative monotonicity property, established in such models by McManus (1962) .
7.9. There are two quite recent papers on improvement dynamics in games with additive aggregation. It seems worthwhile to compare them with this paper. Dindos and Mezzetti (2001) study the convergence to the set of Nash equilibria of some stochastic better reply processes; in the case of a finite game, this amounts to studying the weak FIP property. The authors concentrate on continuous games, however, relying on fashionable analytical techniques and boldly piling up assumptions.
Considering discretization, they assume that any discrete model must contain the equilibria of the continuous model (where they exist by concavity); thus, our regular games would be inadmissible in most cases. This paper concentrates on finite games, in order to investigate the underlying combinatorics. Dubey et al. (2002) is much closer in spirit to this paper. Its main advantage is that their scheme (a first version of which was developed by Huang, 2002, for some- what different purposes) treats strategic complements and substitutes symmetrically.
This should be contrasted with the fact that the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 here have literally nothing in common despite considerable similarity in formulations [ the asymmetry could be vindicated, though, were it proven that Theorem 2 is wrong under nonstrict (3) ]. Second, they can treat some nonseparable forms of aggregation which avoid this approach; for instance, the sum of all partners' strategies (in each player's utility) can be replaced with the sum of the strategies of neighbours, provided the reciprocity condition holds: if i is j's neighbour, then j is i's neighbour.
The weakest point of the scheme is its all but absolute refusal to have anything to do with multiple responses; accordingly, the main results are about "pseudopotentials" rather than potentials. It cannot also be applied to general (nonadditive) separable aggregates covered by this paper. Apparently, we should hope for a synthesis in the future. 
A B C D
On the other hand, the game cannot be made symmetric by any reshuffling of the strategies and/or monotonic transformations of utilities (e.g., no strategy of player 1 participates in two distinct equilibria while D of player 2 does), so Theorem 3 cannot be applicable. Were Theorem 2 applicable, the standard trick with reversing the order on one of X i 's would make Theorem 1 applicable too.
Let us suppose that the strategies of each player can be embedded into the real line (i.e., ordered) in such a way that (2) 
